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This paper explores the questions of equality and social justice for 
people with disabilities in sports and, by extension, other civil 
societal practices that involve the pursuit of excellence. I argue that 
such practices come within the purview of justice depending on the 
interplay between political activism, institutionalized anti-
discrimination statutes such as the ADA, and the internal norms of a 
practice. There are many ways to interpret the ADA, and a 
successful argument for a right to a pursuit of excellence requires 
that the ADA be understood as an anticaste principle. That 
interpretation allows me to show how even voluntary, ostensibly 
apolitical social practices can stigmatize groups of people — people 
with disabilities, for example — and how such practices can be 
refigured to bring about social justice. 
 





In summer 1999, nine wheelchair users filed a lawsuit against the 
organizers of the New York City Marathon (NYCM), alleging 
discrimination that violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
Wheelchair athletes had been allowed to participate in the NYCM, 
one of the world's largest marathon races, for 20 years, but not on 
the same terms with able-bodied runners. The plaintiffs alleged in 
their complaint that they were routinely but randomly stopped by the 
police so that elite runners could pass, sometimes for up to 40 
minutes; they did not have a competitive wheelchair division; and 
that there were no prizes, award ceremonies or media exposure for 
them (Litsky, 1999). The general theme of these practices was that 
people with disabilities didn't really count as  athletes. For example, 
that they could be stopped implied that improving the times in which 
they finished the 26.2-mile race wasn't significant, even though it 
was a goal even the most recreational, 5-hour, able-bodied 
marathoner could have. Their not having a competitive wheelchair 
division implied the same, since it lumped together hand-pushed 
racing wheelchairs and chairs using bicycle gears. The implications 
were made explicit by the absence of prizes or even finishers' 
medals for these athletes. 
 
 This particular dispute has been settled, more or less happily, and 
given recent progress in disability sport, might seem like only an ugly 
reminder of a bygone era. After all, there is evidence to suggest that 
disability sport has been significantly "mainstreamed" and people 
with disabilities are recognized as athletes: Since 1988 the 
Paralympic Games have been held in the same venues as the 
Olympic Games, and there has been increasing cooperation 
between the International Paralympic Committee and the 
International Olympic Committee (see, e.g., International Paralympic 
Committee, 2005b; DePauw & Gavron, 1995). Golfer Casey Martin's 
victory in the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001 to use a cart on the PGA 
Tour also was seen as a major victory for disability sport 
(Greenhouse, 2001; Abbott, 2001). And, in running, the NYCM had 
been a bit of an outlier, anyway: most other major marathons in the 
world had had competitive wheelchair divisions at least since the 
1980s. 
 
 Things aren't quite so simple. How mainstream disability sport has 
become remains an open question (Darcy, 2003), and the political 
and legal victories haven't been forgone conclusions; tenacious 
opposition persists (see, e.g., the disability-related commentary on 
overlawyered.com). In general, the NYCM case points to still tricky 
questions about the participation of people with disabilities in sports 
and similar social practices. On what terms may people with 
disabilities participate in competitive sports? What particular sports 
can they participate in, and why? How can we tell who should be 
allowed to participate? Ultimately, these issues raise questions about 
social justice: Are voluntary pursuits of excellence — where 
distinguishing between better and worse is the whole point — within 
the scope of social justice? If they are, how do we determine when 
justice has been done and when an injustice of some kind exists? 
 
 The easy — but mistaken — answer is that questions of justice 
don't even arise in cases like the NYCM challenge. That is because, 
on such a view, social justice is about the equal distribution of what 
Alasdair Macintyre (1984) calls external goods, and not about goods 
internal to a practice: a liberal-democratic state ensures you have a 
right to pursue a job (external good), but no entitlement to one 
(internal good); a right to education (external), but not to becoming 
the valedictorian at your school (internal). Similarly, the view goes, 
the ADA and other such institutionalized rights at most ensure a 
person with a disability the right to participate in a pursuit of 
excellence, but no entitlement to anything that would count as 
excellence. 
 
 The easy answer is mistaken because it confuses participation with 
 meaningful  participation. A person's mere presence at a pursuit 
does not mean she actually participates in it; it depends on what 
terms she does it. But this does not obviate the bigger questions, 
just refocuses them: Can there be a right to a meaningful 
participation in a pursuit of excellence, and on what terms? 
 
 The answer is that it depends on the interplay between three 
factors: the politicization of a practice (someone needs to make a 
demand), institutionalized principles of justice (e.g., the ADA), and 
sometimes inchoate, often controversial ideas of what the practices 
in question are all about. In what follows, I explore the relationship 
between the factors, focusing on the latter two. First, there are many 
ways to interpret the spirit of the ADA, and a successful argument 
for a right to a pursuit of excellence requires that the ADA be 
understood as an anticaste principle. That interpretation allows me 
to show how even voluntary, ostensibly apolitical social practices can 
stigmatize groups of people — people with disabilities, for example 
— and how such practices can be refigured to bring about social 
justice. 
 
II. The ADA as an Anticaste Principle 
 
 
In her 1984 book The Disabled State, Deborah Stone argued that 
the key to understanding disability politically was to think of the state 
as attempting to maintain the uneasy boundary between two 
distributive systems, work and need. At least in the west, the 
historical thread in disability policies had been to make sure that 
those "genuinely" unable to work got whatever help they deserved 
without those able to work receiving perverse incentives not to do 
so. If we accept Stone's analysis, then the ADA looks truly 
groundbreaking: Congress explicitly framed the law as a corrective 
to unjust  discrimination against people with disabilities. There is 
much to be said for reading the ADA as a good-faith piece of civil 
rights legislation, the kind of legislation that shows the state's 
commitment, however grudging at times, to the fact that distributive 
justice isn't only about the just distribution of material goods: it can 
be about the just distribution of rights, opportunities, capabilities, 
even recognition and respect. The ADA is premised on the idea that 
disability policy shouldn't only involve taking care of needs while 
discouraging shirking; it tries to correct the world so that someone's 
having a disability does not mean she is entitled to fewer 
opportunities and respect than non-disabled persons. The ADA 
enshrines that social value into law and says that the value is 
important enough for the state to use its coercive apparatus to 
enforce it. 
 
What that social value is is open to some interpretation. Samuel 
Bagenstos (2000) has compellingly argued that the injustice in the 
case of disability is the creation of stigma (Goffman, 1963; Karst, 
1989) and that the best interpretation of the ADA is to read it as an 
institutionalized piece of what Cass Sunstein (1994) calls the 
"anticaste principle" (See also Francis & Silvers, 2000; Koppelman, 
1996). On that view, the state wants to ensure that people with 
disabilities do not become group who are seen as less worthy than 
people without disabilities. Insofar as people with disabilities have 
been treated as less worthy than others, the state must try to 
eradicate such practices. 
 
 To see the implications of this interpretation of the ADA in one set 
of cases, I turn to sports. 
 
 
III. Sports, Civil Society, and Justice 
 
Why the focus on sports? In a general way, they reflect society's 
broader ideas about merit and excellence, fairness and norms. They 
are profoundly conventional, which is to say, cultural, creations of 
human agency. A. Bartlett Giamatti (1989) suggests sports — like 
arts — reflect two of humankind's highest aspirations: self-
knowledge of one's freedom, on the one hand, in a community 
shared by mutual agreement, on the other. We needn't agree with 
Giamatti's formulation to think sports are indeed an important 
cultural site in which at least our modern society tries to sort out 
many of its broader value commitments. 
 
 Let us specify these dimensions. First, sport is a social practice in 
which the idea of achieving something others value as praiseworthy 
is the whole point. Second, in sports, this praiseworthiness depends 
on competition: to the extent people do something better than 
others, they are ranked as more praiseworthy than those others, 
and whoever is better than everybody merits most praise. This 
competitive dimension is a constitutive norm; that is, it makes the 
practice what it is. There are many other social practices which are 
about the pursuit of excellence, but where competition is not 
constitutive: arts, for example. Further, in sports the standards of 
excellence are supposed to be as clear as they come. This isn't 
quite true: Sure, there are objective measures, but their application 
depends on what categories are salient, as we will see later. 
 
 Finally, sports are a feature of civil society — the constellation of 
associations and institutions distinct both from the state and from the 
domestic sphere — and as such almost entirely voluntary. Citizens 
can choose between different kinds of engagement in sports or 
simply choose not to engage in them at all. 
 
 That practices in civil society are voluntary does not mean that they 
cannot be within the purview of justice. Civil rights struggles over the 
last century have convincingly established that questions of justice 
arise in the civil society. That is, for example, what the ADA's public 
accommodations clause addresses. But what remains open is the 
way and extent to which specific practices are to be open to all 
comers — or what "all comers" actually means. The  legitimately 
discriminatory nature of sports — discriminating between better and 
worse by internal standards — makes them a particularly good case 
to puzzle through the relationship between legitimate and illegitimate 
discrimination. It makes them political and politically interesting. 
 
 Modern sports have been an important site for many kinds of 
politics, but I focus here only on the question of whether sports 
themselves can become instances of justice and injustice to people 
with disabilities. In effect, I am asking whether Harlan Hahn's 
observation on disability and work (1985, 312) can be more than a 
metaphor. Hahn wrote: "The right of disabled citizens to have an 
equal chance to compete with the nondisabled in a race rigged 
against them by factors unrelated to their individual talents may be 
incompatible with the standards of a democratic society." 
 
 So the question is: In an actual race — tournament, game, match — 
are the standards of success "unrelated to the individual talents" of 
people with disabilities? The intuitive answer of people sympathetic 
to disability rights is likely yes, as is my final answer in the paper: 
"Disability" in one dimension does not preclude talent and excellence 
in others. But, intuitions notwithstanding, the answer isn't obvious. 
First, people disagree: commenting on the Achilles Track Club 
lawsuit against the NYCM, a participant in an online runners' forum 
wrote in 1999: "I sympathize with the handicapped [sic], but racing 
isn't something they should try to do." To be sure, the view reflects 
the very attitudes that help generate the stigma the ADA tries to 
correct against. But it also, accurately, reflects the view that sports 
are a pursuit in which difference makes a difference, and in that way, 
reflects a more general position specifically critical of disability rights: 
"Even if one concedes a role for government in eliminating private 
discrimination, one must also acknowledge that discrimination 
against disabled individuals is different in kind from discrimination by 
reason of race, national origin, religion, or sex" (O'Quinn, 1991). 
The theoretical and political challenge for those who think that 
Hahn's point does apply in sports is to show why and how the 
difference of a disability isn't the same as comparatively less 
valuable talent. 
 
 To anticipate my conclusion: We can meet the challenge by 
rethinking about the meaning of excellence in sport. This will show 
us that the meaning indeed admits different kinds of talents without 
requiring any fundamental change in the meaning of the excellence. 
My argument, in other words, isn't about "dumbing down" excellence 
in sport — a familiar conservative lament about claims of equality 
since at least the 18th century (See, e.g., Epstein, 1966; Herzog, 1998) 
— but simply about showing that disability is perfectly compatible with that 
excellence. 
 
 I bring up the conservative worry about general equality deliberately: The 




IV. Equal Opportunity to What? 
 
Let's return to the New York City Marathon and the lawsuit brought 
by the nine members of the Achilles Track Club, an international 
organization for wheelchair athletes. 
 
 In their defense, the New York Road Runners Club (NYRRC), which 
conducts the marathon, cited concern for wheelchair users' safety 
as one of the reasons their progress was often delayed and why 
they weren't always allowed to start at the official starting line (Litsky, 
1999; McKinley, 1999). The plaintiffs considered these arguments 
both patronizing and disingenuous, and soon enough the NYRRC 
did begin to make real concessions, which led to a general out-of-
court settlement. For the November 1999 marathon, they promised 
wheelchairs would not be delayed on the course and promised to 
introduce a special wheelchair division for the year 2000 race and 
prize money by 2001. (In the non-disabled divisions, the prize money 
runs in tens of thousands of dollars.) 
 
 So although the problem has gone away and although the NYCM 
was, as I said earlier, a political laggard in the world of distance 
running, it is useful for our exploration to begin with the 
philosopher's usual move and call into question something no longer 
in dispute. Why should wheelchair athletes participate in a footrace 
in the first place? Wheelchairs have wheels, footraces are events 
where people run or walk. First, why should wheelchair users get to 
participate at all and, second, why should they participate in 
footraces? Let's begin with the second, more specific question: Why 
footraces? The answer is a pragmatic one, although no less robust 
for that: Although a wheelchair user can, on the average, move 
faster than a person on foot (which is why wheelchair athletes 
usually begin their race a few minutes before runners), the speed is 
closest to a person on foot. Notably, push-rim wheelchairs are 
significantly slower than racing bicycles, the other possible reference 
group. Furthermore, a wheelchair is the most quotidian mode of 
movement for a person with a mobility disability, just like feet are for 
able-bodied persons. Part of the appeal of organized running and 
walking for people who enjoy it is that it is so easy to do; one can, in 
theory, jump into a footrace just as one is. The more general idea is 
that disability is not the same as inability. As DePauw and Gavron 
observe, the recent tendency in disability sport classification has 
been to focus on functional abilities, not on disability (1995, 11, 
120–127; see also Sherrill, 1998, 33–35; International Paralympic 
Committee, 2005a). 
 
 This gets us to the question of why athletes with disabilities should 
get to participate in an able-bodied persons' race in the first place. 
Here is a rough first cut for an answer: Wheelchair athletes should 
get to participate (1) because some wheelchair users can engage in 
a competition which is in most essentials the same as the 
competition by people not in wheelchairs, (2) because some of them 
also want to engage in such competitions, and (3) because our 
intuitions about the norms of a liberal society say that if someone 
wants to do something she can do without burdening others, she 
should get to. That was the logic on which people with disabilities 
argued for their admittance into footraces in the late 1970s. Things 
weren't simple then because in the absence of the ADA, there was a 
gap between the political intuitions and a specific institutionalized 
principle that would apply. To some extent, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 as well as later disability-specific statutes such as the 
Architectural Barriers Act or the Rehabilitation Act enacted to help 
people with disabilities in other contexts afforded enough legal and 
political analogies for a legitimate case by analogy (see Sunstein, 
1993). 
 
 In the case of the New York City Marathon, again a visible landmark 
in these matters, much turned on how (1), the wheelchair users' 
ability to participate, was interpreted and on whether the ideals of 
equal opportunity applied in the case. Interest in participation — (2) 
above — wasn't the issue; that was the very reason the demand was 
made in the first place. The organizers of the race did not deny that 
people with disabilities can participate in  some athletic activities, but 
they argued that they could not participate in a footrace aimed 
primarily at able-bodied runners without seriously endangering 
everybody. Fred Lebow and James Fixx, the race directors, argued 
in a hearing in front of the New York Human Rights Commission that 
the speed of the wheelchairs made them so dangerous to biped 
runners that they should not be allowed to participate (McCarthy, 
1979). The argument didn't fly, however, and by October 1980, the 
Human Rights Appeal Board issued a final ruling that wheelchair 
athletes had to be allowed to participate. 
 
 Think about the argument more theoretically. In any loosely liberal 
polity, one central notion of equality of is the idea that opportunities 
should be equalized. The difficulty is to figure out what it means: 
People differ in needs, inclinations and talents. Differential needs 
may mean that equal opportunity requires differential resources: 
Wheelchair ramps in buildings are a familiar example. Differential 
inclinations and talents mean that it can be difficult to tell whether 
someone lacks or has lacked equal opportunities: Maybe my relative 
poverty is a choice not to pursue the American Dream, or maybe I 
did pursue it but invested my money badly. In neither case is it 
obvious that I lacked opportunities comparably equal to others. 
 
 For these two reasons — that different needs require different 
resources and that inequality of achievement does not prove 
inequality of opportunity — Amartya Sen has argued that the best 
interpretation of equality is an  equal capability to function as a 
human being (1985, 1992, 1993; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, 
1992, 2000). People are equal when they enjoy the capability — 
whether utilized or not — to pursue the variety of things that society 
considers full human life. People are unequal when they are denied 
any such capability, whether as a result of intentional discrimination 
(explicitly racist, sexist or ableist beliefs, say) or structures that 
produce a discriminatory effect (people with disabilities 
systematically lacking access to educational resources, say). 
 
 The implications for disability are important. If we think that any 
human being is prima facie eligible for a full human life, then we 
have to be attentive, from the word go, to the widely diverse 
opportunities and abilities among people to reach it. This requires 
that even severe "natural" physiological limitations be rendered as 
costless as possible. "Natural" limitations include human- dependent 
actions such as accidents, but the idea is the same: If my capability 
is or gets limited, justice demands that the limitation be as costless 
as possible. The ideal, even if it is not fully realizable, is that nature 
or accident denies no one the capability to function. 
 
 Among the familiar implications of this view is the argument for why 
the state is not only justified but required to use extra resources for 
people with disabilities for, say, renovating buildings in order to 
make them accessible. The logic was also applicable in the context 
of the wheelchair marathon controversy in the late 1970s. 
Washington Post columnist Colman McCarthy (1979), for example, 
argued as follows: 
 
 I side with the handicapped. If the wheelchair is what they have 
been forced to use for transportation, then the wheels of their 
vehicle are actually their feet and legs. Why should either an 
accident of birth, or an accident on the highway or a war zone, 
disbar someone from sharing the roadway with the able during a 
marathon? 
 
 To deny the wheelchair users participation would be to deny them 
an equal opportunity to participate in a meaningful human activity; 
that the actual mode of their activity — wheelchairs instead of feet — 
is different is by itself no argument. They can have recognizably 
comparable activity even in the very same event. Insofar as there 
are genuine logistical differences because of the physical aspects of 
the wheelchairs, providers of the services must try to accommodate 
them, instead of using the difference as grounds for denying the 
right to participate. In practice, that has been done, quite 
successfully, through measures like letting the wheelchairs begin 
their race a little before the runners or by letting blind athletes use 
guides. 
 
 All this should be familiar and in principle if not in practice 
uncontroversial. It still makes a difference, however, to what extent 
we take "reasonable accommodations" now explicitly required by the 
ADA to imply something like "compensation for misfortunes." Many 
people have tended to think of them on those terms: like the 
anonymous commentator in the runners' online forum I quoted 
above, they "may feel for the handicapped." This can help foster the 
idea that equalization is somehow equivalent to remedial education, 
itself an idea laden with a patronizing attitude and so a source of a 
stigma. When someone is stigmatized, her identity is "spoiled," as 
Goffman (1963) puts it. This isn't, in the first instance, about the 
goings-on in her head: the "spoiled identity" is the person's social 
identity, how others see her. One of the things people don't expect 
of "defectives" is excellence. 
 
 This is why the argument requires our interpreting the ADA as an 
anticaste principle: On that interpretation, to think that a person 
cannot or should not hope for an excellence is to stigmatize and so 
inconsistent with the demands of justice. That is also why the 
demands of justice are not met when wheelchair athletes just get to 
wheel through the course of the NYCM: They are, in some way, 
obviously participating in the event, but they are not participating in 
what makes the event what it is. They are specifically denied the 
richer opportunity. 
 
 But I have not yet offered an argument for why justice requires that 
wheelchair users be allowed to participate in this pursuit of 
excellence, on these particular terms. We also don't know how the 
argument so far applies to disability sport in general. For example, 
does the current arrangement for Paralympic Games — same 
venues as the Olympic Games, different time — satisfy the demands 
of justice, or violate them? To say that these issues are purely 
logistical is to sidestep the question: The equality-as-capability 
model explicitly denies the primacy of logistical considerations. 
 
 Despite the legitimately bad rap the notion of "separate but equal" 
suffers from, it may sometimes be legitimate. That depends on why 
the separation exists, and that, in turn, on the internal meaning and 




V. Meaningful Competitions 
 
Recall that one of the reasons I am focusing on sport is that it's a 
social practice where the notion of excellence is relatively 
straightforward. In sport, there are reasonably clear measures of 
excellence, of ranking participants, of measuring relative success. 
Competitors aim to do as well as possible and, ultimately, aim to win. 
 
 Of course, especially in recreational sports, many people don't aim 
to win; increasingly, people don't aim at excellence at all. They do it 
for health, to raise funds for a charity, to have fun with friends — in 
short, for recreation. Even so, the notion of competition is still partly 
constitutive of most such events: people do get ranked, whether 
they care about it or not, and winners do get awards. Given the 
nature of the practice, opportunity to participate in it on fully equal 
terms would mean an equal opportunity to meaningful competition.  
 
 Consider what "meaningful competition" means. "The hope of 
winning" might be one interpretation. The Olympic slogan citius, 
altius, fortius — faster, higher, stronger — captures this idea: There 
are straightforward objective measures of achievement, and 
excellence is ascribed to people comparatively by how they line up in 
displaying their prowess. The greatest praiseworthiness is due the 
person who outperforms everyone else because he or she has 
reached the goal everyone is after. It seems to follow, then, that for 
competition to be meaningful, everyone must have a realistic hope 
of being the winner. But this is impossible: people's talents and 
abilities vary widely,  both because of agent-independent reasons 
("natural" and "normal" distribution of talents, available resources, 
etc.) and for ones that do depend on the person's own efforts (e.g., 
practice). Especially in recreational sports the majority of people 
have zero hope of winning, regardless of how much they might 
practice. At the same time, as Norman Daniels points out in his 
discussion of mental disability (1997, 282), the seemingly benign 
fact that talents are normally distributed does raise real questions of 
disability justice. 
 
 So another interpretation of "meaningful competition" might be to 
eliminate the effects of the luck of birth and other factors that don't 
depend on the person's own efforts. That way, the argument might 
go, competition would indeed be fair: The person who applied 
herself most diligently to practice would come out as the winner -- A 
for effort. The insurmountable difficulty with this approach, however, 
is that it is impossible to separate the factors clearly enough: While 
there is some agreement of what, say, genetic factors contribute to 
particular kinds of athletic prowess, these factors tend to be quite 
variable: I might be a good distance runner thanks to my natural 
motor efficiency (itself likely an genetic interaction effect); you might 
be good because of your congenitally high number of red blood 
cells. Second, there are agent-independent causes for those mental 
dispositions that motivate persons in pursuits of excellence. 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), for example, can 
impair a person's ability to excel academically or in an athletic 
pursuit (Sherrill, 1998, 515). Some of these are "natural," that is, 
something the person is born with; others may depend on forms of 
"nurture." And, finally, for better or for worse, social conceptions of 
excellence do, as a matter of sociological fact, incorporate both the 
appreciation for individual effort and intersubjective measures. A 
figure skater's quadruple jump is praiseworthy precisely because it is 
so difficult for anyone to accomplish, and no matter how much I train 
I will not merit similar appreciation if I can't even get off the ice. 
Sometimes "A for effort" makes no sense. 
 
 But the luck of birth can be taken into account to some extent. What 
happens in practice is that "excellence" gets relativized to some 
particular reference group. For a female figure skater, it is excellent 
to achieve a triple jump, for example. These groups are "ascriptive 
proxies": The groups are carved out in a way to make competition 
meaningful. The idea is that two randomly selected individuals from 
a given reference group should have an equal hope of beating one 
another on a head- to-head effort. 
 
 These classifications are contingent. Old categories can become 
pointless and new ones necessary. For example, in ultra-long 
distance running, some evidence suggests women are beginning to 
emerge as inseparable from men in terms of average and aggregate 
achievement, which suggests sex divisions may disappear from that 
particular event (Bam et al., 1997; but see Coast et al., 2004). That 
follows from the idea that the categories exist as contingent but 
necessary means for making competition meaningful. As soon as we 
realize this, it becomes obvious that the "original" categories and 
standards of excellence are equally contingent, and in fact, were 
usually created to make able-bodied men's competition meaningful 
(Boxill, 2003; Elias, 1986; McIntosh, 1979). 
 
 All of this applies directly to disability sport. The categories are 
more numerous but the logic isn't. "Classification is simply a 
structure for competition. Not unlike wrestling, boxing and 
weightlifting, where athletes are categorized by weight classes, 
athletes with disabilities are grouped in classes defined by the 
degree of function presented by the disability" (International 
Paralympic Committee, 2005a). Similarly, the logic of "open 
competition" — the "freedom to enter an event in which one meets 
eligibility requirements with respect to times and distances, with no 
consideration given to functional or medical classification" (Sherrill, 
1998, 35) — is also a direct corollary of this understanding of 
meaningful competition. (Open competition can also be a double-
edged sword in a world in which disability sport doesn't enjoy the 
popularity or appreciation of able-bodied sport: If the visually 
impaired runner Marla Runyan prefers to compete in the Olympics 
instead of Paralympics, it may seem to imply that the level of 
excellence in Olympics is greater.) 
 
 On this logic, it is straightforward that "meaningful competition" for 
wheelchair athletes would be to compete among other, similarly 
situated wheelchair users. Wheelchairs have an effect on athletic 
performance: On the average, in the aggregate, they make the 
athletes faster than biped runners. A separate competitive division 
for wheelchair users is a way of making sure competition also 
remains meaningful for runners. And because the type of wheelchair 
a person uses reflects her functionality, the logic also suggests why 
there should be many, not just one, wheelchair categories: The 
average differences caused by the mechanical differences both 
change the nature of the endeavor and make an average difference 
in the outcomes (DePauw & Gavron, 1995; International Paralympic 
Committee, 2005a). 
 
 Still, this functional understanding of meaningful competition can 
seem to come in tension with ideas of excellence, however 
contingent the latter. There are many ways of carving out groups so 
that their aggregate and average performances vary. Why are some 
chosen over others? Why are some mandated by considerations of 
justice, as I argue, and others not? The concern — historically 
attributed, as I suggested above, to conservatives — is that a 
proliferation of categories will "dumb down" notions of excellence. "If 
everybody is special," a character worries it in the popular film "The 
Incredibles," "then nobody is" (Bird, 2004). 
 
 Although this may be true in the abstract, there is no obvious 
reason to believe that proliferation of categories by itself creates a 
slippery slope. Let's consider the issue with a recent category 
controversy. The newest addition in many endurance sports has 
been the creation of weight categories. In many competitions, 
heavier runners now get to compete in many races in their own 
"Clydesdale" divisions on the undeniable logic that in running, weight 
is functional: Carrying more puts one at a disadvantage to lighter 
persons. While commonplace in many other sports — wrestling, 
boxing — in endurance sports these divisions are highly 
controversial. 
 
 There are several reasons for the controversy (for a sample set of 
issues and opinions, see Anonymous, 2002). The most obvious one 
is that the demand for such categories is explicitly political, just as in 
(other) disability sports: activists in organizations like Team 
Clydesdale (http://www.teamclydesdale.com/) make a political 
demand for inclusion (see also Kirkland, 2003). This can generate 
opposition for many reasons; the most important is based on the 
widely held but most likely false belief that a person's weight is more 
or less up to her, and that, therefore, she can make competition 
meaningful for herself simply by losing weight. This is analogous to 
the argument that if I fail my examination because I haven't studied, I 
have no cause for complaint. The background principle is what some 
call "luck egalitarianism" (Arneson, 2000; for a critique, see 
Anderson, 1999): Equality requires eliminating the "arbitrary" effects 
of agent- independent factors for how a person's life turns out, but it 
doesn't require compensation for the opportunities she herself has 
squandered. This argument depends on the extent to which weight 
really is within a person's voluntary control — there are good 
reasons to think the voluntarists exaggerate it (see, e.g., Crespo & 
Arbesman, 2003) — and the outcome of the weight category debate 
in that respect will partly depend on the outcome of the larger 
empirical and political controversy. 
 
 But the general point is that a weight category in these endurance 
sports is wholly contingent, the justifiability of which depends on 
social conventions and on political agreement among participants, 
not on any obviously undeniable facts. Facts matter, of course, as 
the controversy about the causes of a person's weight suggests, but 
equally significant is the interpretation of the facts and the decision 
about which facts are salient and which aren't. The key open 
question for society to settle is, Can heavy endurance athletes' 
performances count as excellence? It's contingent, but not arbitrary: 
it depends on what kinds of reasons end up winning the day. At the 
moment, there is no agreement on weight. Issues are significantly 
more settled but nevertheless analogous in the case of disability, 
sex, and race: Society's contingent — if in some quarters grudging 
— view is that category separation on the basis of disability and 
gender is legitimate, whereas race-based categories would now 
indeed seem insidious (even if race might make a functional 
difference in terms of achievement: see Meyer, 1998; Littwin, 1998). 
 
 
 So meaningful competition is determined by social conventions, 
which, in turn, reflect social values. There is no reliable decision 
principle that would settle the case of which differences ought to be 
regarded as salient and which shouldn't, even when anti-
discrimination law tells us to be careful with some particular ones. 
First, sometimes we can't even agree on how we should conceive 
some social practice. (Is education about producing a skilled 
workforce or informed citizenry?) Second, even when we agree on 
the point of a practice, say, sports, we may disagree about what it 
means. But, again, the disagreements needn't be irreconcilable. I 
have tried to suggest why wheelchair athletes have a compelling 
logic for their inclusion: Long-distance endurance sports are about 
endurance, and it would be unfair to ban people with disabilities who 
nevertheless can test their endurance. At the same time, it would not 
make sense to allow someone with an electric wheelchair to 
participate. But consider the Casey Martin case in contrast. Although 
I find the U.S. Supreme Court's decision correct, it strikes me as less 
obviously correct. There are difficult open questions: Should it be a 
constitutive rule of golf that competitors walk between holes, as the 
PGA Tour argued against Martin? And even if it not, might the PGA 
Tour or similar institution unilaterally change its  conception of 
measuring golf excellence to include such a rule? There are better 
and worse reasons, and sometimes we come to agreements. But the 
questions aren't settled anything beyond the contingent reasons we 





I have argued that voluntary civil-societal practices such as sports 
can come within the purview of justice and that we can argue — on 
the basis of contingent reasons and against the backdrop of anti-
discrimination laws like the ADA — that a person with a disability can 
have a defensible a right to meaningful competition. What 
meaningful competition is within a given set of practices and how the 
right is interpreted can vary widely. Moreover, it depends, as I have 
argued, on how the practices in question are understood. 
Competition in sports is about excellence, and the political 
arguments therefore are about the nature and meaning of 
excellence. I have suggested some of the ways in which supporters 
of disability sport have shown disability to be perfectly compatible 
with athletic excellence, but I have also pointed to the ways in which 
these questions are unavoidably contingent. For that reason, they 
often remain — appropriately — political. 
 
 What, then, about cases where disability sport appears organized 
on a "separate but equal" principle? Consider first: insofar as the 
"anticaste" principle against the stigmatization of people with 
disabilities is correct, the Achilles Track Club athletes' demand that 
they be allowed to participate as athletes in the NYCM and not in 
some parallel event is significant: Stigmatization and its opposite, 
respect, are social expressions. In this case, for example, the 
millions who line along the streets of New York to watch the event 
are, whether intentionally or not, part of a collective expression of 
respect for the participants in the event. Now consider a slightly 
different case: the opening ceremonies of the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics. There, one of the final torch bearers was Betty Cuthbert, 
a wheelchair user, and the final one an Australian Aboriginal athlete, 
Cathy Freeman. We could interpret this as distasteful tokenism that 
attempts to hide Australia's enduring stigmatization of people with 
disabilities and its indigenous population. But we can also — even 
simultaneously — interpret Cuthbert's and Freeman's inclusion as a 
genuine expression of equal respect for people with disabilities, 
racial minorities, and women (Cahill, 1998, 1999). One thing about 
sport — high visibility Olympic sport in particular — is that it says 
something, in addition to what it does:  whether it changes people's 
attitudes and beliefs, whether it hides existing practices of 
discrimination and oppression, its symbolic message does matter as 
a kind of political recognition (for a distinction between saying and 
doing, see Austin, 1979). 
 
 I conclude by flagging but not answering the question of whether 
the separation of Paralympics and Olympics is a problem from the 
perspective of thinking of athletes with disability as capable of 
comparable and equal excellence with non-disabled athletes. On the 
one hand, we may point to a trajectory of greater recognition of 
Paralympics by important institutional players such as the 
International Olympic Committee: the events may be separate, but 
the message surely is that they are more comparable than they 
used to be (Dickinson, 1996; Leal, 1992; Pingree, 1998; Mascagni, 
1996). And we may join Simon Darcy (2003) in sounding a cautious 
note of optimism about the actual arrangements in the 2000 Sydney 
Paralympics, even if they were far from perfect and even if their 
long- term effects on social attitudes toward disability may be 
uncertain. That may suggest that the separateness of the events is 
not a problem. But on the other hand, it may be the very 
separateness that causes the wide disparity in spectatorship and 
attendance: in Sydney, for example, spectators at the Olympics 
outnumbered the spectators at the Paralympics by a five-fold 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002). And whatever official 
recognition of athletes with disabilities got as equals, Darcy's 
evaluation suggest, they got through political pressure from disability 
activists (2003, 753). It is, in short, not yet clear yet that a separate 
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